

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
SUPERIOR COURT

ROCKINGHAM, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT

Steven Rand, et al.

v.

The State of New Hampshire

No. 215-2022-CV-00167

**ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS CONCERNING SWEPT CLAIMS**

In this case, the plaintiffs challenge the manner in which the State carries out education-related obligations imposed by the State Constitution. See Doc. 17 (Pls.' Am. Compl.). On November 20, 2023, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that certain practices concerning the Statewide Education Property Tax ("SWEPT") are unconstitutional, and enjoining the State from continuing those practices "[b]eginning with the budget cycle commencing in late-2023 and culminating in budget votes in March or April 2024[.]" See Doc. 86 (the "SWEPT Order"). The State now moves for a stay of the SWEPT Order pending appeal. See Doc. 91. To expedite the appellate process, the State also seeks a ruling that the SWEPT Order constitutes a final decision on the merits. See Doc. 92 (the "Rule 46(c) Request"); see also Super. Ct. R. 46(c). The Coalition, an intervenor representing certain New Hampshire cities and towns, joins in the State's motions, see Doc. 93, and moves for partial reconsideration of the SWEPT Order, see Doc. 94. The plaintiffs object to reconsideration and the requested stay, but assent to the Rule 46(c) Request. See Doc. 95. After review, the Court finds and rules as follows.

## Background

The SWEPT Order includes a detailed summary of New Hampshire’s education funding jurisprudence. See Doc. 86 at 2–9. To the extent relevant, that summary is incorporated by reference here. By way of brief background, “Part II, Article 83 of the State Constitution imposes a duty on the State to . . . define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability.” Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist. v. State, 174 N.H. 154, 156–57 (2021) (“ConVal”) (citations and quotations omitted). Pursuant to Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution, “constitutional taxes” must “be proportionate and reasonable—that is, equal in valuation and uniform in rate.” Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 468 (1997) (“Claremont II”) (citations and quotations omitted)).

Over time, the legislature has crafted several tax schemes aimed at complying with the above-described constitutional obligations. See, e.g., id. In resolving questions regarding those tax schemes, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has also clarified the nature of the State’s constitutional obligations. In Claremont II, for example, the court explained that because taxes intended to raise education funds serve a “State purpose”—i.e., fulfilling the State’s duty “to provide a constitutionally adequate education . . . and to guarantee adequate funding”—such taxes must be “proportional and reasonable throughout the State in accordance with” Part II, Article 5. Id. at 469–70 (emphasis added). The supreme court reaffirmed this ruling in Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), concluding that a proposed “special abatement” intended to offset excess tax revenues—that is, education tax revenues generated by a given community above the amount necessary for that same community “to provide the legislatively

defined ‘adequate education’ for its children”—would run afoul of Part II, Article 5. 142 N.H. 892, 899–902 (1998). One year later, the Supreme Court tripped down on the requirement that education tax schemes be uniformly applied, concluding that the State could not perpetuate the unconstitutional application of such a tax via a five-year phase-in of the uniform tax rate. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Statewide Property Tax Phase-In), 144 N.H. 210, 212 (1999) (“Claremont III”).

Today, RSA 198:40-a, II, sets forth the annual per-pupil cost of providing the opportunity for a constitutionally adequate education (“adequacy aid”). The State raises adequacy aid funds via the SWEPT. See ConVal, 174 N.H. at 159. Since 2011, the State has allowed communities that raise SWEPT revenues above their respective adequacy aid levels to retain the excess. See Laws 2011, 258:7 (eff. July 1, 2011) (eliminating requirement that communities pay excess SWEPT funds to Department of Revenue Administration (“DRA”) for deposit in education trust fund). For certain other locations, the DRA has set negative local education tax rates to offset the applicable SWEPT rate. See Doc. 86 at 10. In December of 2022, the plaintiffs successfully moved for summary judgment with respect to their claim that both practices result in an effective SWEPT tax rate that is not uniform, in violation of Part II, Article 5. See Doc. 50 (Pls.’ Mem. Law) at 3, 14; Doc. 86 (SWEPT Order) at 15–16 (“[T]here can be no meaningful dispute that allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds lowers the effective SWEPT rate paid by those communities”); id. at 16–18 (emphasizing that public education system benefits entire State, and concluding that “setting of negative local education tax rates which offset the SWEPT . . . runs afoul of Part II, Article 5”). As a result, the Court enjoined the State from continuing either practice. See id. at 21.

## Analysis

As noted at the outset, the State and the Coalition have filed several motions concerning the SWEPT Order. See, e.g., Doc. 94. The Court will first address the Coalition's motion for partial reconsideration. See id. Notably, this motion does not challenge the substance of the legal rulings set forth in the SWEPT Order, but rather the remedy provided in response to those rulings. See id. In particular, the Coalition suggests that an immediate suspension of the practices at issue—i.e., allowing communities to retain excess SWEPT funds or to avoid such an excess via negative tax rates—will cause substantial hardship to those communities that have benefitted from these unconstitutional practices for the past twelve years. See id. at 2. In addition, the Coalition argues that it would be too disruptive to adjust local budgets in response to the SWEPT Order at the current stage of that process. See id. at 3–6 (arguing this shift will result in voter confusion and prevent communities from completing important projects). Given these concerns, the Coalition argues that the “public interest and balance of harms” weigh against injunctive relief. See id. at 7–8 (noting excess SWEPT funds would be held in escrow pending appeal, and citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 534 (1987) in support of claim that if enjoined party “would suffer injury” and injunction “does not remedy” plaintiffs’ harm, “injunction should be denied”).

This is not the first time the Coalition has raised these concerns. Rather, the Coalition voiced substantially similar concerns in connection with a November 28, 2022 hearing on the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief. See Doc. 41 (Coalition’s Obj. Pls.’ Mot. TRO & Prelim. Injunct.). At that stage of the proceedings, the Coalition argued that the “mere” fact that the plaintiffs’ “constitutional rights . . . have

been allegedly violated” did not amount to irreparable harm. See id. at 4. Moreover, in comparing the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries to the potential fiscal impact on Coalition members, the Coalition took the position that the relevant harms were “obviously one-sided[.]” Id. at 6. Significantly, however, that view was premised on the Coalition’s perception that preliminary injunctive relief would put “dozens of communities in ‘crisis’ and facing a million-dollar deficit in sixty days.” Id.

In denying the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court was persuaded by the Coalition’s time-based arguments, noting:

The Court in no way wishes to minimize the significance of the plaintiffs’ claimed constitutional injuries. Nevertheless, the Court cannot ignore the substantial, immediate, and concrete harm that the Coalition members and their constituents would suffer if the Court were to grant the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief. Because the Commissioner [of the DRA] is responsible for carrying out the State’s education funding scheme, the Court cannot fault the Coalition members for relying on the Commissioner’s years-long practice of allowing them to retain excess SWEPT funds or offset their respective SWEPT rates.

Doc. 48 (Dec. 5, 2022 Order) at 11; see UniFirst Corp. v. City of Nashua, 130 N.H. 11, 14 (1987) (explaining that in exercising discretion concerning requests for injunctive relief, courts consider circumstances of each case and apply principles of equity).

In the Court’s view, however, the equitable scales have shifted. As an initial matter, the Court remains both unpersuaded and deeply troubled by the characterization of the plaintiffs’ injuries as a “mere” violation of their constitutional rights. See Doc. 41 at 4; see also Doc. 94 at 7–8 (arguing plaintiffs “will not gain any benefit from” injunction because excess SWEPT revenues will be held in escrow pending appeal). New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42E requires that every attorney admitted to practice law in New Hampshire “take and subscribe an oath to

support the constitutions of New Hampshire and of the United States." Further, as the Claremont III court recognized, "[t]he New Hampshire Constitution is the supreme law of this State," and "[e]very person chosen governor, councilor, senator, or representative in this State is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Part II, Article 84 to 'support the constitutions' of the United States and New Hampshire." 143 N.H. at 158. Against that backdrop, the Court concludes that although the plaintiffs will not sustain an immediate fiscal benefit from the disgorged funds, they will derive significant benefit from injunctive relief that cures the above-described constitutional violations.

In weighing that benefit against the concerns raised by the Coalition, the Court notes that the Coalition has now been involved in this litigation for well over a year. In addition, having reached the merits of the plaintiffs' Part II, Article 5 SWEPT claims, the Court is persuaded that the clarity of the relevant legal landscape should have inspired Coalition members to plan for the fiscal impacts of the SWEPT Order during the pendency of this action. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 142 N.H. at 899–902 (concluding "special abatement" intended to offset excess education tax revenues would run afoul of Part II, Article 5). As the Court previously recognized, it might have been imprudent or impractical for communities to collect additional tax revenues during prior budget cycles in anticipation of the rulings set forth in the SWEPT Order. See Doc. 86 at 20. Given the substantial jurisprudence supporting the plaintiffs' claims, however, it would have been both prudent and practical for those communities to consider the fiscal impact of the plaintiffs' SWEPT claims when planning for this budget year. See Doc. 50 at 1–3 (explaining plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment in December of 2022 so communities could plan for "next property tax year").

In the Court's view, any failure to prepare for the foreseeable suspension of unconstitutional practices does not justify the continuation of those practices. See Claremont III, 143 N.H. at 158 ("Absent extraordinary circumstances, delay in achieving a constitutional system is inexcusable. The legality of the education funding system in this State has been questioned for at least the past twenty-seven years . . . . The controlling legal principles are plain."); see also Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Aesop, "The Ant and the Grasshopper," Aesop's Fables Together with the Life of Aesop 115 (Rand McNally 1897) in support of proposition that if people are "wise like Aesop's ant, during the summer and autumn of their lives they store up something for the winter"). Accordingly, the Coalition's motion for partial reconsideration is **DENIED**.

In moving for a stay of the injunctive relief set forth in the SWEPT Order, the State and the Coalition raise similar arguments concerning the wisdom of directing the DRA to collect excess SWEPT funds and hold them in escrow pending appeal. See Docs. 91, 93. For the reasons outlined above, those arguments are unavailing. In addition, the State also maintains that holding excess SWEPT funds in escrow will prove overly complicated. See Doc. 91 ("The DRA will have to segregate those excess funds by local jurisdiction and . . . account for excess SWEPT that municipalities were unable to collect"). The Court is, again, unpersuaded. The DRA is well-versed in determining tax revenues to be collected from individual communities, and tracking amounts collected and owed. The Court is thus confident that the DRA can readily devise a system for recording the amount of excess SWEPT revenues generated by and collected from individual communities while this matter is pending appeal. To the

extent any communities fail to remit the requisite level of excess SWEPT revenues, the Court is similarly confident that the DRA can follow existing protocols to obtain the missing amounts or offset them through other means.<sup>1</sup>

Consistent with the foregoing, the motions seeking a stay of the remedy set forth in the SWEPT Order pending appeal are **DENIED**.

The final pending SWEPT motion is the State's Rule 46(c) Request. See Doc. 92; see also Super. Ct. R. 46(c). Rule 46(c)(1) provides:

When, in a civil action that presents more than one claim for relief . . . , the court enters an order that finally resolves the case as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . . , the court may direct that its order . . . be treated as a final decision on the merits as to those claims . . . if the court:

- (A) explicitly refers to this rule;
- (B) identifies the specific order or part thereof that is to be treated as a final decision on the merits;
- (C) articulates the reasons and factors warranting such treatment; and
- (D) finds that there is an absence of any just reason for delay as to the party or claim that is to be severed from the remainder of the case.

As noted at the outset, all parties assent to the State's Rule 46(c) Request. See Docs. 93–94. Upon review, the Court agrees that the relief requested in that filing is warranted. In particular, while the SWEPT Order pertains to the manner in which the DRA collects education tax revenues from local communities, see Doc. 92 ¶ 2, the plaintiffs' remaining claims concern the sufficiency of the education funding the State provides to local communities. See id. ¶¶ 2–3. Those issues implicate distinct legal

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<sup>1</sup> The State and the Coalition seemingly suggest that the DRA cannot compel communities to collect or remit excess SWEPT revenues. The Court views this suggestion with extreme skepticism. Though the Court has heard no evidence concerning this issue, the Court would be surprised to learn that communities collect and remit State taxes on a purely voluntary basis. Rather, common sense suggests that the DRA has mechanisms in place to enforce the tax scheme, perhaps by offsetting uncollected or improperly retained amounts via a reduction in State grants or aid. If the State wishes to further contest the DRA's authority in this context, it may file a timely motion for reconsideration, following which the Court will schedule an evidentiary hearing regarding this narrow issue.


questions. Moreover, given the compelling interests involved, there is no just reason to delay appeal of the SWEPT Order. Accordingly, the State's Rule 46(c) Request is **GRANTED**. See Doc. 92. The Court thus directs that the SWEPT Order is to be treated as a final decision on the merits with respect to the plaintiffs' Part II, Article 5 challenge to the administration of the SWEPT. See Super. Ct. R. 46(c)(1).

#### Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the Coalition's motion for partial reconsideration is **DENIED**. See Doc. 94. The State's motion for a stay of the injunctive relief set forth in the SWEPT Order, see Doc. 91, and the Coalition's joinder in that motion, see Doc. 93, are also **DENIED**. As set forth above, if the State wishes to contest the DRA's authority to enforce the relevant aspects of the tax scheme, it may file a timely motion for reconsideration, following which the Court will schedule an evidentiary hearing concerning that narrow issue. Finally, the State's Rule 46(c) Request is **GRANTED**. See Doc. 92.

SO ORDERED.

Date: February 20, 2024



Hon. David W. Ruoff  
Rockingham County Superior Court

Clerk's Notice of Decision  
Document Sent to Parties  
on 02/20/2024